The Pond in Central Park



Under Review (Ask me for a draft!)

Reflecting on the pervasiveness of discrimination throughout human history, it’s clear that stereotypes have a strong hold on us. But why? In this paper I argue that stereotypes occupy a privileged position in our cognitive architecture. Unlike other types of information, stereotypes are prioritized in judgment and decision-making. I present empirical work with Jorge Morales and Chaz Firestone in which we demonstrate how prioritized stereotype information can disrupt even basic perceptual judgments about stereotype-incongruent people. This disruption causes interactions with stereotype-incongruent people to be experienced as disfluent, subtly motivating us to discriminate against them in virtue of their incongruent social identities. 


Under Review (Ask me for a draft!)

The nonverbal social cues that accompany speech (for example, facial expressions, gestures, and eye gaze) can be as communicatively significant as the content of the speech itself. In this paper, I identify what I argue is a very common—but philosophically unexamined—phenomenon: our tendency to allocate nonverbal cues is sensitive to conversational participants’ levels of respective social power such that people with more power receive comparatively more positive and affirming nonverbal cues than people with less power (e.g., looking and smiling less at someone in virtue of their low social power). I call this ‘nonverbal marginalization’ and argue that it commonly tracks social identities like race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. In sections one and two, I introduce and empirically situate nonverbal marginalization and argue that we can understand the harms it creates through the lens of epistemic injustice. In particular, I argue that experiences of nonverbal marginalization are harmful because they typically involve what Kristie Dotson calls epistemic oppression and what Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice. In section three I argue that nonverbal marginalization sheds novel light on two significant bodies of empirical literature from social psychology (stereotype threat and performance gaps between high and low power social groups) and conclude with a discussion of how individuals and institutions can go about mitigating the effects of nonverbal marginalization.


To appear in The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence, ed. Kevin Tobia, Cambridge University Press, (2023).

What do we owe to other peoples’ social identities? I have argued that basic facets of people social identities are owed what philosopher Stephen Darwall calls ‘recognition respect’—i.e., the respect we owe to features of people, irrespective of any performance or appraisal (Baker & Green 2021). But, if this is the case, how do individuals and legal institutions cash this out (i.e., what is it to show recognition respect to someone’s race, gender, disability, or sexual orientation)? This chapter explores the empirical and legal dimensions of conceptualizing social identity through the lens of recognition respect. I argue that respect for social identities can be crucially understood as a type of ability knowledge. Drawing from the empirical literatures on learning and socialization, I give an account of how individuals and institutions can acquire the relevant ability knowledge to engage with people in ways that appropriately affirm and acknowledge their perspectives and identities. Much of my analysis focuses on recognition of transgender identity. I situate the recognition-respect-as-ability-knowledge framework for social identities in the psychological literatures on person perception and implicit bias and make concrete claims about how my account can be legally implemented by appealing to discrimination law. 

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Forthcoming in Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 42(1), (Fall 2021).


The phrase “legal name” appears everywhere, often justifying discrimination against transgender people. And wherever it appears, it seems to come with an assumption that it picks out one, clear such name for each person. So, do “legal” names as the phrase is commonly understood really exist? As far as federal and most state law is concerned, it turns out the answer is a clear 'no'. This article seeks to highlight the legal, moral, and philosophical wrongness of the notion that people have one uniquely identifying legal name. To do that, we survey the status of names in various legal domains, highlighting that legal consensus tends to be that there is no one “correct legal name” for individuals (if anything, people often have many “legal” names). We argue this common notion that every person has a single, clearly defined “legal name” is a kind of collective delusion we all seem to share (emerging somewhere in the late twentieth century), but is not grounded in legal or social reality.  To address this harmful delusion, we present a series of ready-to-cite conclusions about the current state of the law and introduce a normative framework for how institutions and individuals ought to choose between people’s various legal names when referring to them. Engaging with legal theory, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of language, we discuss the social function of names and argue that names enable people to communicate important social information about themselves—which can include their gender, religion, and familial relations. Thus, we conclude by arguing that individuals and legal institutions have a normative responsibility to respect peoples’ preferred legal names, thereby allowing them to authentically represent these facets of their social identities. 


Published on PsyArXiv (2021); Abstract published in Journal of Vision (2019)

Stereotypes shape our judgments about people around us—as when women are assumed to be students, research assistants, or nurses rather than professors, principal investigators, or doctors. Can stereotypes also intrude on representations that have nothing to do with the content of the stereotype? Here, we explore how the assumptions we make about other people impair our ability to process completely incidental, and surprisingly low-level, aspects of their appearance—including even their location in space. We showed subjects headshots of male and female medical professionals, and asked them simply to indicate the direction of the target’s shoulders (left or right)—an extremely straightforward task that subjects performed with near-ceiling accuracy. The key manipulation was a cue on each trial that the upcoming image would be of a “doctor” or a “nurse”, and a statistical regularity in the experiment such that “doctor”-labeled images tended to face one way and “nurse”-labeled images tended to face the other way. Although gender was completely irrelevant to any aspect of the task, subjects were slower to judge the orientation of stereotype-incongruent people (female “doctors” and male “nurses”) than stereotype-congruent people (male “doctors” and female “nurses”), even though the images were labeled arbitrarily. Follow-up experiments showed that this effect couldn’t be explained by the raw surprisingness of, e.g., seeing a man when expecting a nurse; instead, these results suggest that even straightforward forms of statistical learning can be intruded upon by long-held social biases, in ways that alter processing of incidental, basic visual features.