

## Introduction to Philosophy of Mind<sup>1</sup>

What is the mind and how does it relate to the body? Our minds are traditionally viewed as thinking things whose internal goings-on (thoughts) stand in rational relation to each other. One thought might give us reason to think another thought. At times, we think what we choose to think, exercising our will and responsibility. In contrast, our bodies are composed of physical processes standing in causal relations to each other. The physical events of the body don't happen because they have reasons to happen, they happen because they are caused.

In this course, we will attempt to bridge these two ways of thinking about ourselves, as minds and as bodies, by studying traditional answers to the mind-body problem. We will consider dualist, physicalist, eliminativist, and buddhist accounts of the mind-body relation. We'll then consider the problems of intentionality—how our mental states can be about something and consciousness—how there can be a way it is like to be in a mental state. Finally, we'll consider whether artificial intelligences have minds, intentionality, and consciousness.

### **Week 1: Dualism: The debate between René Descartes and Elisabeth of Bohemia**

Descartes Meditations 1-3, Selected readings from the Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes

Jen McWeeny “Princess Elisabeth and the mind-body problem”

*Simons A. “Causation and Cognition in Descartes”*

### **Week 2: Exclusion and Causal Closure**

Jaegon Kim “The nonreductivist's troubles with mental causation”

David Papineau “The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism”

### **Week 3: Making Sense of Physicalism**

Louise Anthony “The mental and the physical”

Jennifer Hornsby “Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith”

*Robert Cummins, “How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psychological explanation”*

### **Week 4: Buddhist Philosophy of Mind**

D. Lusthaus, “Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Cheng wei-shih lun”

*Christian Coseru “Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy”*

*Jay Garfield “Western Idealism through Indian Eyes: A Cittamātra Reading of Berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer”*

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<sup>1</sup> Optional readings in italics

### **Week 5: Eliminativism about the Mental**

Patricia Churchland "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes"

Richard Rorty "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism"

*Robert Brandom "An Arc of Thought from Rorty's Eliminative Materialism to His Pragmatism in Perspectives on Pragmatism"*

*Paul Churchland "Matter and Consciousness"*

### **Week 6: Mind-Brain Identity Theories**

J. J. Smart "The Mind/Brain Identity Theory"

Donald Davidson "Mental Events"

*Jennifer Hornsby "Anomalousness in Action, in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson"*

### **Week 7: Functionalism: Reconciling the mind with physicalism**

John Haugeland "Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design in Mind Design"

Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines"

*John McDowell "Functionalism and Anomalous Monism in Mind, Value and Reality"*

*Helen Beebe "Epiphenomenalism for Functionalists"*

### **Week 8: Externalism: Against Functionalism**

Hilary Putnam "The Meaning of Meaning"

Tyler Burge "Individualism and the Mental"

*Nick Shea "Does Externalism entail the Anomalism of the Mental?"*

*Ruth Garrett Millikan "Thoughts Without Laws; Cognitive Science with Content"*

### **Week 9: Cognitive Science: The Mind as an Information Processor**

David Marr "Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information."

Frances Egan "Computation and content"

### **Week 10: Consciousness and Materialism I**

Thomas Nagel "What is it like to be a bat?"

David Lewis "Mad Pain and Martian Pain"

*Frank Jackson "What Mary Didn't Know"*

*Kathleen Akins "What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?"*

### **Week 11: Consciousness and Materialism II**

David Chalmers "Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness"

Katalin Farkas "How to Close the Explanatory Gap"

*David Chalmers "Spatiotemporal Functionalism v. The Conceivability of Zombies"*

**Week 12: Naturalistic Intentionality**

Jerry Fodor chapter 4 of *Psychosemantics*

Ruth Millikan "Naturalizing Intentionality"

*Tim Crane "How to Explain Intentionality"*

**Week 13: Artificial Minds**

Cameron Buckner "From deep learning to rational machines: what the history of philosophy can teach us about the future of artificial intelligence."

Daniel Dennett "Artificial Life as Philosophy"